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I
n medical ethics, a large body of work exists on the virtues that enable good medical practice. Medical virtue ethics singles out a number of virtues of the good doctor for attention; among others, these include empathy, care, truthful-ness, and justice (Batt-Rawden 2013; Carel and Kidd 2014; Jackson 2001 Jackson , 2002 Leffel et al. 2014 ). According to medical ethicists like Pellegrino and Thomasma (1993) , however, phronesis, or "practical wisdom," occupies a special place among these virtues (83). For Pellegrino and Thomasma, phronesis is "indispensable" to good medical practice, because it coordinates all the different moral virtues that the doctor must bring to ethical decisions as part of wise moral action. This paper outlines the background to a current dispute about how moral judgements are made and how this disagreement shapes professional education and development. We argue that empirical work is necessary to inform the required normative debate, and that a particular narrative method is the best way to do this.
From Rules to Phronesis
The most ethically challenging decisions in medicine are often cases in which there are multiple conflicting moral and medical goals that the doctor feels bound to pursue. In many troubling cases in medical ethics, clinicians must, for instance, weigh up the different goods that can be pursued for the patient-should they seek to prolong life or ease pain in the palliative care setting, for example. On occasion, the good for a particular patient must also be weighed up against the good for others-for instance, who, out of a range of suitable patients, should benefit from an organ transplant when only one organ is available. Furthermore, even when it is clear what good to pursue, there are often multiple ways in which this good can be promoted. Is it best, for instance, to prescribe a drug, advise on nutrition or, in extremis, advocate surgery, when faced with co-morbid conditions like overweight, high blood-pressure, or high cholesterol?
When faced with such uncertainty, the response of many policy-makers, administrators, and even clinicians is to reach for the rulebook-that is, to make ever more intricate guidelines, protocols, and procedures to determine what clinicians must do in morally fraught situations. Upshur (2014) , for instance, documents the growth of clinical practice guidelines over the last 25 years, noting that 73 clinical guidelines could be found in PubMed in 1990, and over 7,500 in 2012. However, in the face of this tide of ever-closer codification of good medical practice, many clinicians bemoan the loss of their professional autonomy. Greenhalgh and others (2012) , for instance, document practitioners' resistance to (and, practically speaking, sabotage) of one system that attempted to codify and constrain physicians' decisions, the UK National Health Service's "Chose and Book" outpatient referral system. The paradox involved in real clinicians' experience of the rules, guidelines, and protocols that today govern clinical practice is this: while these rule-based mechanisms are supposed to bring clarity, accuracy and consistency to clinical judgments and make it easy to know what to do, doctors themselves experience the growth of these guidelines and procedures as alienating, confusing, and even demeaning. summer 2016 • volume 59, number 3
The basic struggle between rule-based governance of clinical decision-making and clinical judgment is played out in a series of different contests. Often, the struggle is portrayed as one between evidence-based medicine (EBM)-or, more broadly, scientific or rationalistic approaches to medicine-and approaches that are more "humanistic" and stress the role of tacit knowledge, clinical experience, professional judgment, and even intuition in clinical decision-making (Braude 2012) . Sometimes the struggle is over the relative power given to individual practitioners over and against administrators, or over patients' expectations that they be treated as persons, not conditions. Moving to the realm of medical ethics specifically, there is a strong current of thought (associated with virtue ethical thinking, but also with contextualist or particularist approaches) that suggests that ethical decisions simply cannot be made in a general fashion, but need to be made on a patient-by-patient basis. As Tyreman (2000) puts it: "A rule-governed decision-making process fails at the crucial point where there is conflict over competing goods or which rules apply. . . . It assumes that there is a right (and wrong) answer rather than a range of possibilities. The best doctor will . . . identify what is good and best for this patient" (121).
But how do clinicians accurately identify what is good for particular patients, and how do they bring about this good as best as possible through intervention? Clinicians reach for a number of concepts to explain what exactly this ability is that the good clinician is supposed to have to understand the good for the patient and how to bring it about. These include "clinical judgment," "experience," "tacit knowledge," and "professionalism," but all of these concepts in turn need to be defined and unpacked. In medical ethics and the philosophy of medicine, one concept in particular is increasingly reached for to explain what it is that the expert clinician knows or can do in advancing the individual good for the individual patient: phronesis, or practical wisdom. Starting with the work of Pellegrino and Thomasma (1993) , a number of scholars have built their conceptions of what good ethical judgment in medicine is on the concept of phronesis (see, for example, Jonsen and Toulmin 1988; Kaldjian 2010 Kaldjian , 2014 Montgomery 2006; Toon 2014) . However, this approach has also been around long enough to generate a critical scholarship. Braude (2012) has argued that phronesis in medicine needs to be supplemented by intuition (nous in Aristotelian thinking). Waring (2000) and Hoffman (2003) hold that Aristotle himself saw medical knowledge as craft or technical knowledge (techne) and not as a form of wise general ethical deliberation (phronesis). Kristjansson (2015) In Aristotle's system of ethics, the moral virtues like honesty, kindness, justice, or courage do not by themselves prepare the moral actor for moral action. According to Aristotle, the moral virtues ensure that we aim at the correct goal in moral action, but a form of practical moral know-how is required to bring those goals about. This is phronesis. For Aristotle, phronesis is wisdom in the domain of praxis (that is, practical moral action) rather than in the domain of episteme (or science). Phronesis fulfils two cardinal roles in Aristotle's virtue ethics: first, it completes the moral virtues, in that it provides the practical know-how needed to turn virtue into successful action (this is the constitutive role of phronesis); second, it enables moral actors to weigh up the importance of the competing goals that they themselves (or others) may have in any moral situation (the integrative role of phronesis) (Kristjansson 2015) .
One of the biggest problems in understanding phronesis in Aristotle is determining whether it is an essentially theoretical or intellectual ability (an ability to think well) or a practical moral ability (an ability to do the right thing). On the one hand, Aristotle quite clearly asserts that phronesis is an intellectual virtue and not a moral virtue; on the other, Aristotle holds that phronesis is practical, rather than scientific wisdom. In the debate between broadly scientific and humanistic perspectives on medicine, it appears that Aristotle takes no clear side.
As Russell (2012) explains, the answer is most likely to be a bit of both. Phronesis in Aristotle has four dimensions. First, phronesis has to do with having comprehension (sunesis or eusunesis): this is the ability to recognize the morally important features of a situation and to assess what is important to achieve in such a situation. Second, phronesis requires good sense (gnome): this is an ability to be reasonable and to see a matter from a number of points of view. Third, phronesis requires a form of intelligence, a quick and overall grasp of the situation that one finds oneself in and a sense of what is to be done in that situation. According to Russell, while Aristotle describes this constituent part of phronesis as nous, and while nous is more often associated with scientific than with moral knowledge, nous is present in both good theoretical discovery and in good practical deliberation. Indeed, Braude (2012) makes his case for intuition in medicine in much the same terms. Fourth, for Russell, phronesis requires the cleverness (deinotes) needed to plan and execute an effective moral course of action.
Phronesis is not only being able to plan or being able to reason in a means/end fashion, it requires seeing situations in a morally intelligent and perceptive way (Russell 2012) . The best way to explain this morally intelligent seeing is to ask what kind of activity the phronimos (the person with phronesis) engages. Phronesis is the epitome of practical ethical deliberation. While this form of deliberation is a deeply intellectual activity, it must not be confused with theoretical or scientific reasoning. A contemporary way of making clear the difference is to say that, while scientific reasoning is descriptive-it aims to describe "how the world is"-moral deliberation is normative, in that it attempts to settle "how the world of human actions or affairs should be." Rather than descriptive (scientific) reasoning, phronesis is a form of practical normative reasoning.
Applying the concept phronesis to medical ethics, Pellegrino and Thomasma (1993) hold that medicine tends to see clinical judgment mainly as an intellectual matter in the first sense-that is, reaching the right scientific conclusions based on the evidence available. While not drawing the distinction between scientific and normative thinking as boldly as Russell, they hold that, because the doctor must seek what is good for the individual patient (a matter not settled by science alone), clinical decisions involve an "integration of scientific and moral reasoning and judgement" found in phronesis.
1 Kaldjian (2010) goes further, suggesting that all clinical decision making is a form of phronesis. First, both clinical decision making and phronesis must involve selection of the good for the patient; second, the elements of clinical judgment (understanding the mechanism of the problem, understanding the means available to address it, and understanding the priorities of the patient) appear very much like the elements of wise decisions; and third, both phronesis and clinical judgment are learned over time in practice-based communities (and not as pure theory or principles). This matter-whether all clinical judgment involves phronesis or whether only those cases in which there are distinctively ethical considerations in play involve phronesis-presents the interesting problem of understanding whether all (or only some) medical problems are essentially ethical.
Studying Phronesis
While all the authors cited above stress the importance of practical wisdom in the practice of medicine, none explore the actual psychology and manifestation of phronesis in real doctors' decision-making. Critical scholarship regarding phronesis has tended to answer questions about the nature of phronesis from the armchair. However, many of the theoretical questions about phronesis can also be asked empirically. This leads to the question of what phronetic decision-making feels like or seems like to real expert practitioners of medicine when they look at wise decisions made over a whole career of practicing medicine, either by themselves or 1 It is important to point out that this integration only makes sense on the assumption that medicine has a particular end goal or telos. The goal of science, one may reasonably suppose, is knowledge, but the telos of medicine is the restoration and promotion of health. This is an important difference between science and medicine: they aim at different things.
by others. Does phronesis seem to them more like a form of thinking, theorizing, or deliberating that is like scientific thinking? Or does it seem more like making intuitive or emotional judgments (the flash of insight)? Is phronesis something that can be captured in words, or otherwise communicated in their experience, or can it only be grasped by the individual in a moment of insight? Is the moral dimension of phronesis always in play when one practices medicine, or does it only activate in those instances when something distinctly ethical is at stake?
Asking real medical practitioners what phronesis feels like from the inside (or asking whether they recognize the concept at all) is not to reduce the philosophical and conceptual matter of what phronesis is to psychology. Rather, it is to hold that theorizing needs to be tested for consistency against real experience. It is also to hold that real experience can generate intuitions that inform theorising. In medical ethics, there is today much greater acceptance of theorising that is empirically informed (Christen et al. 2014) , and in the field of medical virtue ethics the benefits of describing real cases and experience are particularly attractive, since virtue ethics insists on the importance of the features of the particular case in deciding what is the right thing to do.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the reason one might want to study phronesis in medicine is not only to understand it, but also to promote it-that is, to help medical students and young doctors to become more practically wise and to create the kinds of medical institutions that will allow and promote wise practice. One cannot design a medical system that allows and promotes phronesis if one does not know (empirically) how the current system may promote or smother its development, or if one does not know (empirically) how to bring about the desirable change one wishes to see. Neither can one teach a student or medical practitioner how to be practically wise if one does not know (empirically) what characterizes their decision-making at present, or if one does not know (empirically) what is the most effective way for a person to develop phronesis.
Putting flesh on the bones of empirically informed bioethical discussion of phronesis is, however, very hard. While many medical and bioethicists advocate for the importance of the development of phronesis in medical education and practice, the actual acquisition and development of phronesis has been little studied in medicine.
This leaves the field in somewhat of a bind, because the main rival to a phronetic approach to medical decision-making-the rule-based (usually deontological) approach to ethical medical decision-making-has a very well-established and powerful body of methods to measure the growth (or not, as the case may be) of logical and rational reasoning about ethical dilemmas in medicine. A useful way to see the terrain is as follows. On a rule-based way of thinking about the nature of moral decision-making in medicine, the right way to make an ethical decision is something that can be captured in codified rules, principles, or guidelines. Moreover, what is needed for individual clinicians to do the right thing is for them to know and understand the rule in question and to be able to apply that rule in a particular context. How clinicians understand and reason about principles in medicine is a matter that has been studied very extensively. Scholars who study the moral development of medical students and doctors from what is called a cognitive perspective draw on moral judgment tests in the tradition of Kohlberg (1981 Kohlberg ( , 1984 . A large body of work exists on the use of such moral judgment tests in medicine (Baldwin and Self 2005; Bebeau 2006 ), but this is not matched by psychological work on the development of moral virtue in medicine (Kotzee and Ignatowicz 2015) .
According to Kohlberg (1981 Kohlberg ( , 1984 moral development from childhood into adulthood takes place through the gradual unfolding of different modes of moral thinking. For Kohlberg, the young child tends to think in terms of self-interest (pre-conventional thinking), and in later childhood and early adolescence progresses to thinking of right action in terms of what is socially desirable (conventional thinking). Eventually, the adult is able to transcend conventional thinking and become capable of independent thought about moral principles (post-conventional thinking). Compared to virtue approaches to ethics, the cognitive approach associated with Kohlberg's work studies mostly patterns of thinking, and a number of cognitive psychological instruments (the moral judgement interview or MJI, and the defining issues test or DIT) are much used to study moral thinking in medicine. Together, tens, if not hundreds, of studies have used these instruments to study moral development in medical students and doctors. One great advantage that rule-based (often, specifically deontological) approaches to medical decision making have over virtue-based approaches, then, is that there exists a considerable body of psychological scholarship on the main concepts in moral reasoning. By contrast, psychological study of the virtues in medicine is in its infancy (Kotzee and Ignatowicz 2015) .
What is the case for the moral virtues generally, is also the case for phronesis. Admittedly, there is a developing study of wisdom in psychology, with a number of different wisdom scales entering use. Glück et al. (2013) , for instance, survey psychometric measurements of wisdom and highlight the psychological measures of wisdom that are already in common use. As they point out, however, there is no agreed definition of wisdom in psychology, and all four of the most prominent measures measure wisdom constructs that are far removed from what Aristotle would call phronesis. As Glück et al. make clear, most wisdom research in psychology focuses on exploring "personal wisdom"-the insight persons gain about their own lives and experiences-or "general wisdom"-insight gained into the human condition generally. While no doubt an admirable trait in any person, there is no obvious practical link between personal or general wisdom in this sense and what researchers in medical ethics would be especially interested in: the ability to make good clinical judgments or wise decisions on behalf of patients. It therefore looks highly doubtful that the measures of wisdom that already exist in psychology can simply be adapted for research on doctors' ethical decision-making.
The Challenge of Studying Phronesis
The central challenge is how to study phronesis while doing justice to the complexity of the concept. According to Kristjansson (2015) , phronesis is generally understood to be the wisdom to judge the right action to be performed in a particular situation when different goals would call for different actions. Thus, by its very nature phronesis cannot be reduced to rules for action, or an algorithm for decision-making. This has led scholars like Hursthouse (1999) to suggest that phronesis is uncodifiable. Indeed, Irwin (2000) explains that Aristotle himself saw the study of virtue as an "inexact science." This does not mean that virtue is a completely subjective matter that cannot be studied; it is only to say that the extent to which a course of action is "virtuous" is a complicated matter that requires much detailed knowledge and careful judgment of people and the situations in which they act. As Curren and Kotzee (2014) argue, the complexity involved in judging the character of a real person can be like the complexity involved in understanding a character in a novel; sometimes the amount of subtle information one needs to judge someone's virtues is much closer to reading and reflecting upon a rich book (or story) than to noting a few numbers on a standardized test.
For this reason, theoretically informed bioethical study of phronesis is much more likely to draw on qualitative approaches-and specifically in-depth narrative research-than on quantitative psychometric approaches. As Zagzebski (2013) points out, people often learn about virtue through firsthand narrative accounts of other people's actions that are thought of as virtuous. Put simply, people understand what it is to be, say, honest, in terms of the examples of persons that they, and others, regard as honest. Furthermore, people often communicate what it is for a person to be virtuous by telling stories. As MacIntyre (1981) puts it: "Generally, a stance on the virtues will be to adopt a stance on the narrative character of human life" (144). There is little reason to think that this would be any different when it comes to phronesis; in fact, Aristotle sees the development of phronesis mainly as a matter of emulating and being taught by people who are themselves practically wise, and who tell stories about being wise.
Within the social sciences more broadly, narrative or storytelling approaches are important for the same reasons. As Lawler (2008) notes: "narratives are integral to social life" (32). Stories are not just sets of facts, but like Zagzebski's exemplar narratives, stories are "organising devices through which we interpret and constitute the world" (Pickering 2008, 6) . Stories are a social and cultural resource that people use to make sense of their lives and others, and one aspect of their lives and culture is morality and the associated moral education that builds morality.
Just as Zagzebski (2013) views narratives about exemplars' traits and actions as integral to moral education, so do social science accounts of narratives link stories with learning right and wrong. Life stories, the factual stories we tell each other about each other, contain within them rules that adhere to what Lawler (2008) calls "intelligibility norms," norms that are local in time and space to our culture and that contribute to our understanding of morality within our own community and culture.
This approach to understanding virtues through storytelling not only reflects the different contexts in which people learn to make decisions, but allows the identification of the exemplars to be revisable should context or circumstance change (Zagzebski 2013) . This type of flexibility allows virtues, and by extension phronesis, to be open to the outcomes of moral debate within and across practices and communities. Narrative studies are embedded in the hermeneutic tradition, focusing on the investigation of meaning and interpretation. According to this view, the importance of a story is not what happened in the story, but what the significance of the story is to the teller, the listener, and the culture within which the story is told (Lawler 2008) . Narratives about exemplars are especially significant, as they promote moral education.
A qualitative approach that values lived experiences and the firsthand accounts of these experiences through storytelling is what is needed to fully understand the role that phronesis plays in moral development in medicine. This approach has already been used with some success in nursing studies examining phronesis in practice (Danbjørg and Birkelund 2011; Eriksen et al. 2014; Farrington et al. 2015; Phillips and Hall 2013; Sørensen et al. 2013 ). The time is ripe to conduct similar studies in medicine.
Narrative Tools for Studying Phronesis
The study of virtue in medicine is in its infancy compared with the study of moral reasoning. As we have seen, however, narratives (the stories doctors and other health professionals tell in order to inform, to teach, or simply to converse) do provide a vehicle to communicate what it is about a specific decision in medicine that makes it wise or unwise. Such narratives have always been told in medical communities, but they have not always been recognized as what they are: an evidence base that illustrates what virtue in medicine amounts to. No author has done more to advocate for the narrative turn in researching medical decision-making than Montgomery (1991 Montgomery ( , 2006 . In fact, Montgomery (2006) terms the specific character of rationality in medicine phronesiology (125). For Montgomery, investigating decision-making in medicine is a matter of studying the extent to which such decisions count as practically wise.
To illustrate how a narrative can serve to illustrate the phronetic character of good decisions in medicine, consider this case detailed by Groopman (2000) and mentioned by Montgomery (2006) . Alex, a physicist, was diagnosed with life-threatening anemia and recommended a bone-marrow transplant by his own doctor, but approached Groopman for a second opinion. Groopman reviewed Alex's bone-marrow biopsy and, while he recognized that Alex was suffering marrow failure, he did not agree with Alex's doctor that this was due to myelodys-plasia or aplastic anemia. In particular, he did not agree with the primary doctor's suggested treatment, an unmatched bone-marrow transplant (a matched donor could not be found). Compared to Alex's doctor, Groopman was unsure what was causing the bone-marrow failure, and he advised the comparatively slow-paced course of action of culturing Alex's bone marrow in the laboratory to see how it behaved.
For Groopman, what stood out about Alex as a patient was the difficulty of explaining to a physicist-a scientist who values certainty and intellectual understanding-that he could not be sure of what was the matter with his bone marrow. By comparison, Alex's primary doctor was sure and did recommend specific (but drastic) treatment. Groopman and Alex's primary doctor clashed bitterly, with the latter saying that Groopman's indecisiveness would cause Alex's death. The choice was Alex's, and his decision came down to which of the two doctors he trusted more. When Alex's primary doctor said that Alex should not second-guess his advice and pointed to his own outstanding CV and accomplishments in the field of blood diseases as proof that he was to be trusted, Alex decided to follow the advice of the more cautious Groopman instead.
Matters soon took a turn for the worse. Alex contracted pneumonia that landed him in hospital for a month, and Groopman, still not sure of the diagnosis, continued with the marrow culture and prescribed a growth factor to encourage white blood cell growth, despite knowing that this could trigger leukemia. Slowly, Alex's white cell counts improved and he began to recover. At the same time, Groopman's cultures showed that Alex's marrow was productive. This ruled out the primary doctor's diagnosis, but did not reveal what was the matter. Months later Alex had recovered fully, and to this day Groopman does not know what Alex was suffering from.
Groopman presents Alex's case as one in which intuition led him to follow a certain route (the cautious one) in diagnosis and treatment. Groopman also holds that he was lucky to have been right. This may be so, but the example also shows much practical wisdom at work in how Groopman balanced the certainties and uncertainties involved in his own thinking (as well as that of the primary doctor) and weighed the advantages of decisiveness and caution. It is not simply the case that Groopman was the more "cautious" and the primary doctor the more "decisive." About the bone-marrow transplant, Groopman was certainly more cautious than Alex's doctor, but about administering the growth treatment, Groopman was the more decisive (or risk-taking). Groopman also had to balance his uncertainty about what ailed Alex with enough confidence in his own judgment to overrule Alex's doctor, and he showed much interpersonal skill in winning Alex's trust through honesty about the unknown and cautious optimism, rather than through an appeal to technical expertise.
What the case shows are the complexities-at once ethical and technical-that are at play in making judgments about what is best for an individual patient. The case also shows how clinical judgment is a case of weighing different factors. This weighing is not accomplished through a flash of insight or through an intuitive knowing what to do based on years of experience; rather, it is a process involving much careful thought-including theorizing and experimenting with Alex's bone marrow in the lab. As such, the case shows that figuring out what is best for the patient does involve what we call theoretical knowledge.
However, the case also shows the relative importance of the demands of treatment and the demands of diagnosis. Recall that Alex was successfully treated despite the fact that Groopman could not reach a diagnosis of what ailed him. Intellectually, this feels unsatisfactory. Clearly, if Groopman could have diagnosed Alex's problem, he would have been able to treat him more effectively; without a diagnosis, we also do not know what the future holds for Alex, and whether the disease may strike again. Given a choice between treating Alex successfully and understanding what ails him, however, the sensible course of action was and still is to focus on effective treatment. It is not that either Groopman or the primary physician necessarily prioritized the latter over the former, it is that the field of medicine requires a particular quality of thought in order to make the best decision for a patient. That quality of thought is practical wisdom, the wisdom to achieve the right thing for that patient, not the wisdom of theory, which is more concerned with discovering the mechanics of what is wrong with the patient. Aristotle labelled this difference as the difference between phronesis and episteme; in contemporary language, we can say that the rationality of medicine is practical rather than theoretical. This is not to minimize the clinical advances due to biomedicine, but only to hold that, while decisions made on behalf of patients draw on science, they are not identical with science.
Groopman's story spoke to us because it illustrates so well the difficulty of making decisions under conditions of uncertainty and because of the range of considerations that Groopman had to balance in helping Alex. As Montgomery (2006) shows in her work, narratives like these are standard fare in medicine: during clinical or teaching rounds or in the presentation of cases at conferences, doctors routinely tell stories like these about individual patients. Because difficult clinical decisions cannot be captured in hard-and-fast rules or protocols, Montgomery holds that doctors have no option but to tell salutary stories like these to represent how difficult clinical decisions are made. In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that learning what it means to be "practically wise" occurs primarily in communal settings where other doctors (seniors as well as colleagues) tell stories of decisions that they have made or seen. MacIntyre (1981) , for instance, holds that any practice (like medicine) is socially constituted, and that good practice is essentially a matter of practicing in accord with the virtues that are admired by the community of practitioners. He writes: "It belongs to the concept of a practice as I have outlined it . . . that its goods can only be achieved . . . in our relationship to other practitioners" (191) . In this relationship, the sharing of narratives plays a crucial part because virtues are essentially explained narratively-by telling stories about how certain people and actions exemplify virtue.
A Systematic Study of Narratives of Phronesis in Medicine
While the growing literature on phronesis in medicine contains the telling of many stories like these, authors from the medical humanities (like Montgomery) have tended to collect and recount such stories opportunistically. Curious about exactly what are the stories told by doctors at various stages of their careers, we have designed a research project to collect medical students' and doctors' narratives of phronesis in medical practice in the United Kingdom in a systematic way. We argue that virtues are understood narratively, and as such it is important to move the debate away from theory that describes examples of abstract or general features of phronetic decision, and instead to examine examples of phronesis in action. In our study, "Phronesis and the Medical Community" (funded for 2016-18 under the Arts and Humanities Research Council's Connecting Communities program), we will conduct interviews and observations and use diary methods to collect narratives of wise decision-making from 120 participating medical students and doctors. Participants will be taken from three medical schools and their associated hospitals in the West and East Midlands. These narratives will present data to help us illustrate what phronesis means in current medical practice, the extent to which it is possessed by practitioners and seen to be possessed at various stages of their career, and how it develops over time. Conroy, Clarke, and Wilson (2012) have shown how one can analyze the stories that health and social care professionals tell about decision-making in terms of "virtue continuums." The method involves identifying all the different considerations that are in play in making a particular decision and showing how the wise decision in that situation is a matter of choosing (for each of those dimensions) a course of action between two extremes. As Aristotle held that virtue lies in finding the mean between two opposite vices, so phronesis, according to this method, lies in identifying the different virtues that one must display in a difficult situation and finding the balance between them. For instance, in the example above, Groopman not only had to find the right mean concerning certainty and uncertainty, but also concerning honesty with Alex, courage and directness in standing up to the primary doctor, and decisiveness (and no small degree of hope) in prescribing the growth factor. Analyzing phronesis narratives is a matter of identifying all of these dimensions and mapping them out.
Having identified the narratives that doctors and medical students at our study sites tell, we will identify 10 such fictional stories to feed back to the medical education community. The stories will be dramatized, performed, and recorded as a series of video clips to show the progression of moral development from the contained environment of medical school to interactions with other professions, hospital boards, and the community in the form of patients' family, patient representatives, pressure groups, press reports, and so forth. These performances will serve as discussion and learning tools to aid in the teaching of medical ethics and professionalism. It is hoped that these dramatizations will not only illustrate for students and their educators the complexity of ethical decisions in medicine, but will serve as a rich source of narrative examples of wise medical decisions in action during their education and future training.
